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I. INTRODUCTION: LAW FROM THE BoTToM UP
American public law has traditionally been understood as an insider's
game. Within this understanding, law is following the rules laid down,
particularly those laid down by the United States Supreme Court. Rig-
orous legal analysis treats Supreme Court opinions as self-contained
exercises to be understood or criticized from the inside - from the
point of view of the Supreme Court Justices who write them. Thus, a
turn-of-the-century formalist would try to situate a decision in the
larger geometric unity of law, or might fault a decision for being in-
consistent with precedent. Although the realists of the 1920s rejected
this sort of analysis and more aggressively criticized the Court, they
too read the cases through the eyes of the Court - albeit a Court fol-
lowing a political or personal agenda. The legal process school of the
1950s was realist in understanding law as policy and formalist in eval-
uating the Court through criteria such as reasoned elaboration, defer-
ence, and coherence with neutral or authoritative principles. But like
the formalists and the realists before them, legal process thinkers were
insiders, viewing law from the perspective of the New Deal Presidency
and Court.
These three generations of differently disposed legal thinkers - the
formalists, the realists, the legal process thinkers - shared a similar
vision: law is something handed down to the populace by high officials
following professional norms, and the citizenry is obligated to follow
the rules simply because they are the rules handed down by the duly
established mechanisms for handing down rules.' Let me be explicit
about the assumptions of traditional law:
0 It is handed down by officials at the "top" to citizens
below. We can call this the top-down assumption.2
1. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Prob-
lems in the Making and Application of Law 4-5 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (1958)); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
2. As used in this article, the top-down, bottom-up terminology was first used in
JACK KNiGHT, INSTtJTIONs AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992). The terminology is used in
similar ways in Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repa-
rations, 22 C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the
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o Law can be criticized only from the inside. Grounds for
criticism must be objective and potentially universal: Is the
decision consistent with other decisions? Does it rest upon
erroneous factual premises? Did it ignore the views of experts
charged with solving such problems? This is the neutrality
assumption of public law.
o Our obligation to follow this law, its legitimacy, derives
from criteria internal to law. Was the decision rendered by
officials charged with making such decisions, and was it de-
livered according to the regular procedures for making such
decisions? This is the positivism assumption.
This understanding of law makes less sense to the Baby Boom
generation that came of age in the 1960s.' For most of us, "law"
meant not just Brown v. Board of Education,4 the 1954 Supreme
Court decision that declared state-required school segregation inconsis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, but also the
private resistance to the de jure apartheid that Brown overthrew. The
story of Brown illustrates the decline and fall of the top-down model
of public law. Equally, it suggests the appeal of a model in which
public law comes from the "bottom up," representing a political strug-
gle among different "nomic" communities.
The legal process generation, the most eminent legal thinkers of
the 1950s, immediately praised Brown as a good decision and claimed
it as one consistent with their strongly top-down vision of law. Justice
Felix Frankfurter, a former law professor, blessed the decision with his
acquiescence, and his acolytes (usually former law clerks) immediately
spread the word that Frankfurter's strategizing within the Court had
Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights,
59 U. CHi. L. REv. 433 (1992).
3. Boomer critiques include ROBERT GORDON, LEGAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE IN
THE AGE OF AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOL-
OGIES IN AMERICA (G. Geison ed. 1983); Thomas Grey, Langdell is Orthodoxy, 45 U. PFrr
L. REv. 1 (1983); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151
(1985). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1990).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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enabled the decision to be unanimous.5 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,
who were then drafting their classic materials on The Legal Process,'
lavishly praised Brown as reflecting a great and enduring "principle" of
racial equality.7 Alexander Bickel adapted his memorandum on the
history of the Equal Protection Clause, which he had written when he
was law clerk for Frankfurter, into a dense and detailed article con-
cluding that Brown was defensible from an historical point of view.'
Paul Freund, Archibald Cox, and other scholars too numerous to men-
tion hopped on the Brown Bandwagon.9
Notwithstanding this enthusiasm, some legal process thinkers un-
derstood that Brown challenged their way of thinking. The most nota-
ble skeptic was Herbert Wechsler, a professor at Columbia whose 1959
essay praised Brown as a decision he liked, but who wondered whether
it was actually "law."' After all, Chief Justice Warren's opinion im-
plicitly overruled several Supreme Court precedents and made no effort
to defend the overrulings as supported by a textual interpretation of the
Constitution or by the original discussions surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Given this default, the only defense of the
decision, according to Wechsler, would be for the decision to rest upon
some "neutral principle," through an opinion "resting with respect to
5. For a recent example of this from a former Frankfurter clerk particularly close to
the Justice, see Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987). More bal-
anced accounts include Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v.
Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991); Dennis Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1954-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
6. Hart & Sacks, supra note 1.
7. See Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term - Foreword, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 96 (1954); Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., to Harry Wellington, Dec. 9, 1959,
FRANKFURTER PAPERs, Harvard Law School Library, Box 187, Folder 20.
8. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955).
9. Paul Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REv. 345
(1958); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreward: Constitutional Adjudi-
cation and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
10. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959). Although Wechsler was virtually the only respectable law professor who was
willing to question the "lawlikeness" of Brown, it is my judgment that his doubts were
widely but silently shared among law professors.
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every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and rea-
sons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."" Under
this criterion, Brown is questionable, Wechsler observed, in some much
quoted analysis:
[Brown] must have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in princi-
ple, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed ....
In the context of a charge that segregation with equal facilities is a denial
of equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if "en-
forced separation stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" it is
solely because its members choose "to put that construction upon it"?
Does enforced separation of the sexes discriminate against females merely
because it may be the females who resent it and it is imposed by judg-
ments predominantly male? Does a prohibition of miscegenation discrimi-
nate against the colored member of the couple who would like to marry?
For me, assuming equal .facilities, the question posed by state-en-
forced segregation is not one of discrimination at all. Its human and its
constitutional dimensions lie elsewhere, in the denial by the state of free-
dom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups
or races that may be involved ....
But if freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration
forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repug-
nant ....
Given a situation where the state must practically choose between
denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on
those who would avoid it, is there any basis in neutral principles for hold-
ing that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should
prevail? .I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet
written the opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the school-seg-
regation cases."
Such an opinion was never written. 3
Wechsler's article initiated an academic discourse that has under-
mined the top-down view of law that Wechsler himself embraced. The
discourse to which I refer is "narrative jurisprudence," in which law's
universalist pretensions are undermined or complexified by particular-
ized storytelling. 4 Remarkably, Wechsler's article is an early exem-
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at 33-34.
13. Id. at 33-34.
14. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989);
1994]
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plar, perhaps the earliest to appear in the Harvard Law Review, of
legal storytelling. The article contains little traditional legal analysis;
most of the analysis is professionally introspective and historical. The
most memorable parts of the article are personal, indeed confessional:
Wechsler identifies himself as the friendliest possible critic of Brown,
because he has a strong pro-civil rights background. He tells a story of
how he worked with a black attorney, and they were unable to dine at
Union Station because of its segregationist policy. Wechsler speaks of
the embarrassment this caused him and his friend. He closes the article
with the above-quoted, hand-wringing criticism of Brown, a criticism
that was most powerful, because it came from someone who identified
himself as unusually prepared to be persuaded by the decision or, in-
deed, to write the decision himself.
Wechsler's article was even more striking for what it assumed.
Unlike the work of his colleagues in the academic legal establishment,
Wechsler's personalized analysis made the assumptions -of his genera-
tion clear to the reader. For one thing, the article made explicit the
author's belief that Plessy v. Ferguson5 had been "law" until it was
overruled by Brown. This brought into sharper focus the traditional
view of our profession that "law" is the stuff handed down by legisla-
tures and courts; no matter how vile a statute is, it is "law" until un-
made through the duly established mechanisms for change (the courts
or the legislatures). More dramatically, Wechsler confessed uncertainty
as to why Plessy should be overruled, insisting upon finding a neutral
principle to do so. What he came up with was a right of association,
which he immediately filtered through his own experience. He openly
questioned whether segregationist law could be overturned simply be-
cause African Americans objected to it, or whether laws hurting wom-
en could be discarded simply because women resented it. Reasons per-
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Mary Irene
Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1992);
Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes,
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV,. 511 (1992). For a
critique, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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suasive in Wechsler's world must be universal, not parochial; neutral,
not partial.
Wechsler's combination of personalized narrative, self-reflective
misgivings about a decision that many doubted but few were willing to
criticize openly, and bizarre rhetorical questions inspired a steady
stream of objections that continue to sound in law reviews today. One
of the first to respond was Professor Charles Black of Yale, who had
worked on one of the briefs in Brown.16 A native of segregated Texas
schools, Black refused to play Wechsler's neutral principles game and
defended Brown at the level of personal narrative -- not just his narra-
tive but the narrative of the people on whom segregation operated. His
decidedly "unneutral" argument for Brown was essentially the follow-
ing:
First, a certain group of people is "segregated." Secondly, at about the
same time, the very same group of people, down to the last man and
woman, is barred, or sought to be barred, from the common political life
of the community - from all political power. Then we are solemnly told
the segregation is not intended to harm the segregated race, or to stamp it
with the mark of inferiority. How long must we keep a straight face? 7
In 1960, most of the legal academy, surely including Wechsler, found
these words indisputable, but they could keep a "straight face" because
they had no vision of "law" that could fully comprehend or incorporate
this sort of argument.
Black's words had great meaning for my generation, however. I
attended public schools in West Virginia, with my seventh and eighth
grades being segregated by race and the ninth through twelfth grades
(recently) integrated. Clearly, racial segregation that still persisted was
related to the residential segregation of African Americans in my town
of Princeton, to the fact that none of the high-paying jobs in town
were held by blacks, and to the social deference people of color paid
to whites. From my point of view, as a white kid, the social,
economic, and educational segregation was morally questionable. If you
16. Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decision, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960).
17. Id. at 425.
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had asked me who were the great figures in American law, I should
have said Earl Warren and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., even though
the latter was not a lawyer.
My grandfather, Horatio Erskine DeJamette, was a West Virginia
lawyer whom I greatly admired, but the main reason I went to law
school was related to my admiration for Dr. King: I had a vague sense
that service as a lawyer could be helpful to people, and liberatory to
some. The most formative thing I read in law school was Richard
Kluger's Siipie Justice, which recounted the "History of Brown and
Black America's Struggle for Equality," as the subtitle put it. 8 I was
overwhelmed by its message that the hero of Brown was not Felix
Frankfurter, who may have exaggerated his role, or even Earl Warren.
One hero was Thurgood Marshall, who not only argued the case, but
sweated blood throughout the South litigating Plessy in front of openly
bigoted judges. There were many more heroes, including the Reverend
Joseph DeLaine and Harry Briggs, who mobilized a wary black com-
munity to challenge segregation in Clarendon, South Carolina; Barbara
Johns, a remarkable eleventh grader in Prince Edward County, Virgin-
ia, who organized a student strike by African-American students and
called in the NAACP to challenge segregation in court; and, of course,
Oliver Brown and his daughter Linda, who challenged the system in
Topeka, Kansas.
Kluger's book suggested to me that "law" is not handed down
from "the top," but often percolates up from "the bottom," from com-
munities of citizens who experience the world or law in a certain way.
Briggs, Johns, and Brown represented a community of interpretation
that had a vision of law different from that in Plessy. Under their
vision, separate cannot be equal if separate is inspired by put-downs at
every level of social and political existence; the state is not being neu-
tral if it builds upon an inhuman social arrangement; skin pigment is
not a valid ground for the state or society to divide-off a segment of
the population and label it inferior.
Before and during my law school career, the main legal academic
voices responding to Wechsler were liberal white voices defending
18. RichApm KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
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Brown as a great constitutional moment. 9 Since my departure from
law school, the academic discourse on Brown has been more heteroge-
neous, and of course more critical. Some academics have argued that
Brown and its implementation have had little if any impact upon
American public education.20 These scholars have picked up on
Wechsler's theme that Brown was inspired by social policy, not law,
and have suggested that the decision represents poor social policy.
Other scholars have argued that Brown as implemented represented a
tepid and substantially self-interested response by white America to
deep problems of racial justice.2 These scholars have read Wechsler
as representative of a white America that literally cannot see the paro-.
chial nature of its own academic and legal standards. Critical race
theory has developed this theme through the natratives, not of whites
like Wechsler and Black, but of those Mari Matsuda calls "voices from
the bottom."'
This sort of narrative jurisprudence (including feminist and
gaylegal, as well as critical race theory) has explicitly questioned the
traditional top-down understanding of public law. Among my genera-
tion, narrative jurisprudence enjoys a receptive audience for its three
central ideas; the exposition that follows should be contrasted with the
three assumptions of traditional law thought (top-down, neutrality, and
positivism) discussed above.
19. In addition to Black, see Cox, supra note 9; Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court,
1967 Term - Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1968); Louis Pollak,
Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
20. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY
YEARS OF DESEGREGATION (1982).
21. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Con-
vergence Dilemma,. 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980); ALLAN FREEMAN, SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION LAW: PROMISE, CoNTRADICioN, RATIONALIZATION, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 86 (Derrick A. Bell, Jr., ed., 1980); Sidney
Willhelm, The Supreme Court: A Citadel for White Supremacy, 79 MICH. L. REV. 847
(1981).
22. See Matsuda, supra note 2.
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A. Law Comes from the "Bottom Up, " Not from the "Top Down"
Although high officials undoubtedly exercise a great deal of discre-
tion as to what emerges as authoritative law, the engines for changing
the law come from below. The effect of positive law is often known
only when people speak up about it, and when a group of people be-
gin to voice similar complaints hydraulic pressure builds for changing
positive law. If those people feel intensely that their vision is the cor-
rect vision, the polity will pay dearly if it ignores them - like the
Terminator, they will keep coming back until the system responds or
they are completely suppressed. In short, the agents of legal change are
the people themselves, not legal elites.
The distinction between a top-down and a bottom-up view of law
is illustrated by an exchange seven years ago in the Harvard Law Re.
view. The Review published an oral history by Philip Elman,23 a
Frankfurter clerk who had served as a link between the Justice and the
Solicitor General's Office for several of the segregation cases. The
history is a classic insider's account, crediting Frankfurter with creating
the opportunity for Brown. Randall Kennedy, an African-American law
professor at Harvard, responded that Elman's insider account slighted
the more important role played by African Americans, especially Mar-
shall and his (NAACP) Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. lit-
igators and the parties to the cases.24 From third-party accounts,
Elman was shocked and deeply wounded by Kennedy's pointed criti-
cism, but no less than Kennedy was shocked and wounded by Elman's
treatment of blacks as "objects" of liberation by white elites, rather
than as "subjects" of their own liberation. For Elman, as for Wechsler,
law is handed down from the top. For Kennedy, as for me, law perco-
lates up from the bottom. This is an important difference in the way
that many scholars in the two generations view law.
23. See Elmnan, supra note 5.
24. Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987).
[Vol. 97:141
HeinOnline  -- 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 150 1994-1995
PUBLIC LAW FROM THE BOTTOM UP
B. Positive Law is Not Neutral and Involves Struggle Among
Competing Visions
The late Bob Cover gave us a vocabulary for expressing this
idea:' the NAACP and its allies were a "nomic" community, them-
selves "jurisgenerative," creating new law that they hoped to persuade
other groups to accept. Note here that not all African Americans ac-
cepted the NAACP's integrationist vision, and the NAACP engaged in
a struggle to persuade other blacks of their vision, with substantial suc-
cess in the 1940s and 1950s.26 Law is made by debates within and
among different nomic communities. Viewed from the bottom, the role
of high officials is not to create or declare law, but to suppress law,
the law of the communities that the officials reject. High officials in
this way are "jurispathic," according to Cover. In Brown they chose
the nomic vision of Thurgood Marshall, and they sought to suppress
the vision of Jim Crow.
If positive official law is jurispathic, how does the official choose
which law to accept? Ever since Wechsler's article, legal scholars have
been debating whether or not Brown can be defended on some neutral
ground, as preferred by traditional legal theory. The evidence of the
"original intent" of the framers of the- Fourteenth Amendment is, as
Chief Justice Warren recognized, not at all helpful.27 Prominent schol-
ars have tried their hands at neutral defenses, and none has been suc-
cessful. The defenses of Brown that have most resonated with my
generation have been those descended from Charles Black's article;28
like Black, these scholars have praised the decision for its moral
prophesy. They have developed an explicitly normativist defense of
25. See Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983), reprinted in NARRATIVE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
26. See generally MANNING MARABLE, W. E. B. DuBOIS: BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT
(1986); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
27. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (original intent strongly
undermines Brown).
28. Black, supra note 16.
29. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 13; MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Law/Constitutional Politics,
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Brown, and the task of critical race theory in particular has been to
develop a theory of racial justice that delivers on the promise of
Brown.
C. Official Choice of Law Does Not Necessarily Settle Matters
The most radical implication of viewing law from the bottom up
is that what the top recognizes as "law" is not only the contingent
choice of the top officials, but is also in need of normative justifica-
tion. Was state-sanctioned apartheid "law" in the sense that people had
a moral obligation to obey it? My recollection of the firehoses turned
on black youths in Birmingham in 1963 and Selma in 1965 is the first
memory I can pinpoint for the proposition that it can be honorable to
disobey positive law if it is immoral. I invoked Dr. King's letter from
a Birmingham jail in an extemporaneous speech praising him in 1969.
When I read about campus protests against the War in Vietnam in
1969, I was unfazed by the college students' violation of private prop-
erty rights. As someone who believed I would face the draft within
four years, I had no sympathy for that unpopular war and felt that it
was the war, and not the student protests, that was illegal.
The civil rights struggle preliminary to Brown taught my genera-
tion that what the Supreme Court said in Plessy was not necessarily
law and might be resisted by communities of opposition. The aftermath
of Brown taught my generation that even when a group wins at the
Supreme Court level, the victory may be a hollow one unless consoli-
dated and followed up by the victorious community and its allies.3" In
other words, officials may have homicidal intent, but do not necessarily
kill the law they reject. The community supporting that vision of law
might continue to resist, and often the choice of law itself may create
a new community of resistance.
99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Anthony E. Cook, The Temptation and Fall of the Original Un-
derstanding, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1163; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Fore-
word: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
30. See S. Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673 (1992).
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II. DOCTRINAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF LAW FROM THE BOTTOM UP
Let me recapitulate the new assumptions about law suggested by
Brown and developed above:
o Law comes from the bottom up. Official law is
influenced, often decisively, by what goes on in communities
subject to their commands. What officials say is law neither
exhausts the subject nor ends debate.
o Choice of law is not neutral. It is deeply ideological,
generational, and subject to shift in response to changed cir-
cumstances.
o Our obligation to obey the law is based upon its
normativity and not just its official pedigree. Every time the
polity tries to suppress a vision of law, it risks its legitimacy,
because it risks alienating groups whose vision has been sup-
pressed.
Consider this vision of law as a way to understand issues of statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation.
A. Statutory Interpretation (Job Discrimination)3
One of the consequences of the South's reaction to Brown and to
Dr. King's peaceful protests was a public outcry for serious civil rights
legislation, which was achieved in 1964. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits employment practices that "discriminate" against
racial minorities. This statute focused on intentional discrimination 2
and set up a cumbersome administrative apparatus designed to mini-
31. This story is influenced by recent archival research set forth in HUGH DAvis
GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY
(1991), reviewed in Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1723 (1991).
See also HERMAN BELz, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1991).
32. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703(a)(1), 706(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(a)(1), -5(g) (1988)); 110 CONG. REC. 12724 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey,
D-Minn.).
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mize the role of the Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
the statute's development;33 both trade-offs were made to attract the
support of conservative Republicans in order to break the Southern fili-
buster in the Senate. Within eight years, a statute aimed at intentional
racial discrimination was interpreted by the Burger Court to prohibit
employer practices that had disparate racial effects. 4 The dynamic
interpretation of Title VII began immediately after the statute went into
force. It began at the declawed EEOC, as the activists who had worked
to enact the statute - civil rights leaders and litigators, bureaucrats,
and law professors - turned to the task of making the statute work to
implement President Johnson's goal of "not just equality as a right and
a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result."3
From its first year in operation, key players at all levels of
the EEOC believed that racial inequality in employment was the result
of structural factors, not just the intentional discrimination identified by
Congress, and that affirmative results were more important than formal
requirements." 6 Based upon her labor law experience, EEOC staff
member Sonia Pressman argued that it would be impractical to expect
evidence of discriminatory intent in most cases. Just as litigants chal-
lenging raial discrimination in jury selection could rely on
underrepresentation of minorities to prove bias, Pressman urged that
plaintiffs ought to be able to make out a claim of employment discrim-
ination based upon underrepresentation of minorities in the
workplace.37 The EEOC legal staff were candid about the tension be-
tween their views and the apparent compromises adopted in the 1964
33. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706 (a)-(f), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(t)
(1988)); GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 146-49.
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. President Johnson's Message at Howard University, 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESI-
DENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON 636 (JUNE 1965).
36. See WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1965).
Several key agency players published explications and defenses of this ideology. See EEOC
Executive Director Herman Edelsberg, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: The First Year, 19
New York University Conference on Labor 289-95 (1967); ALFRED W. BLUmROsEN, BLACK
EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW (1971).
37. Memorandum from EEOC staff attorney Sonia Pressman to EEOC General Counsel
Charles T. Duncan, 31 May 1966, described and quoted in GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 244-
47.
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statute, but urged that their approach was the most practical way to
enforce the statute. By the end of the Johnson Administration, the
EEOC Commissioners publicly interpreted the statute to bar employer
practices "which prove to have a demonstrable racial effect."3 The
EEOC's rationale for an effects-based approach was that such an inter-
pretation better served the statutory purpose. This position was shared
by the NAACP and other civil rights litigation groups. Directly encour-
aged by the EEOC, which filed helpful amicus briefs, civil rights liti-
gation groups challenged employer testing, and union seniority arrange-
ments had disproportionate and negative effects upon African Amer-
icans. These groups sometimes found a receptive audience in Eisen-
hower and Johnson-appointed federal judges who were struggling with
similar issues of racially discriminatory effects of arguably "neutral"
state policies in the areas of education, voting, and jury selection.
What turned out to be the critical litigation was Griggs v. Duke
Power Company,39 a class action challenging employee tests used by
Duke Power for hiring and promoting, on the ground that the employ-
ee tests had a discriminatory effect against African Americans, who for
years had received third-rate educations in segregated North Carolina
schools. The NAACP lost in both the district court and the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but over a powerful dissent by Judge Simon
Sobeloff, President Eisenhower's Solicitor General, who had argued
Brown and who in Griggs endorsed a disparate impact approach as the
only way to fulfill the goals of Title VII.40 Upon appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the NAACP worked from Sobeloff's dissenting opinion,
other lower court cases adopting a disparate impact approach, the
EEOC's 1966 guidelines on employment tests, and a supportive amicus
brief filed by Solicitor General Erwin Griswold for the Nixon Admin-
istration. Viewing the Supreme Court's unanimous adoption of a dispa-
rate impact approach in Griggs from the top down, reasoning from the
38. EEOC Commissioner Samuel C. Jackson, EEOC vs. Discrimination, Inc., THE
CRISIS 16-17 (JAN. 1968).
39. 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1968), aft'd, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The litigation is analyzed from the EEOC's point of view in Alfred
W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
40. Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1239-44 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
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authorities available to the Court (the statute, its legislative history, and
precedent), scholars and pundits were surprised by and critical of the
Court's analytically weak opinion in Griggs. But viewing the opinion
from the bottom up, reasoning from the political alignments in the
case, facts revealed about employment practices and their counterpro-
ductive effects, and the needs giving rise to the statute, careful observ-
ers should not have been so surprised at the Court's opinion, which
closely followed the analysis suggested by the nation's most eminent
Republican lawyers (Sobeloff and Griswold), the leading civil rights
group, and the agency charged with implementing the statute.
B. Constitutional Law (Gender Discrimination)
An assumption of the Constitution's framers was that women are
not part of the public citizenry: they were considered submerged in the
family unit headed by the husband,4' and like slaves and poor men,
women were not entitled to vote." Notwithstanding their subordination
in both the family and the polity, women in the early United States,
especially those in the upper classes, asserted their personal and politi-
cal rights against the traditional claims of their "inferiority."43 Women
gained important political experience as leaders in the abolitionist and
temperance movements of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Recall
such heroines as Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Harriet
Tubman in the abolitionist movement, and Susan B. Anthony in the
temperance movement. Led by Mott and Stanton, an assembly of
women and men at Seneca Falls, New York (Stanton's home) issued a
"Declaration of Sentiments" on July 19, 1848, which asserted the for-
mal human equality of men and women (tracking the language of the
Declaration of Independence but expanding it to include women) and
protested the "entire disenfranchisement of one-half the people of this
41. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. XV (1765) (no separate legal
existence of wife apart from her husband).
42. See generally M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERI-
ENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 (1980). No state granted women the right to vote
until 1869 (Wyoming) and 1870 (Utah).
43. See, e.g., MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
(1972); SARAH GRMKE, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES (1838).
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country." Seneca Falls is an important moment in the creation of a
new community of interpretation, urging equal rights for women.
Although women were among the leading abolitionists, and many
abolitionist leaders such as Stanton and Frederick Douglass advocated
suffrage for women as well as the former slaves, the male leaders of
the movement quickly abandoned female suffrage after the Civil War
and focused their attention on the former slaves.44 Thus, the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution said nothing about women's right to
vote, and the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly wrote "male" into the
Constitution. Bitterly disappointed by the betrayal of their supposed
male abolitionist and Republican allies, Anthony and Stanton emerged
as voices for women to take direct action to assert their citizenship.
The frustrating experience of the Reconstruction Amendments was
confirmed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of them in Bradwell
v. Illinois.45 Myra Bradwell's application for a license to practice law
had been denied by the Illinois Supreme Court solely because she was
a married woman. The Supreme Court affirmed this judgment with
only one dissent. Justice Miller's opinion for the majority was boring
and technical, but Justice Bradley, speaking for three Justices, con-
curred in the judgment on broader grounds, explicitly articulating a
theory of gender:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to
Osay identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to
the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed
was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a
44. See ELLEN DuBoIs, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPEN-
DENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT iN AMERICA 1848-1869 (1978).
45. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal exis-
tence separate from her husband....4'
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause interpreted in Bradwell
was a dead end for gender equality cases in the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court could not kill the idea of women's equality. It was an
idea that would not die, and constitutional litigation over gender issues
continued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The Supreme Court continued to rebuff such challenges. For ex-
ample, in Goesaert v. Cleary,47 the Court upheld a statute allowing a
woman to work as a bartender only if she were the wife or daughter
of the bar owner. "The Constitution does not require legislatures to
reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than
it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards."48
Even the Warren Court did not invalidate a single statute that discrimi-
nated against women. For example, in Hoyt v. Florida,49 the Court up-
held a statute excluding women from juries unless they affirmatively
requested the clerk of the court to place their names on the jury lists.
Defendant Geraldine Hoyt argued that the lack of women jurors tainted
her conviction for killing her husband with a baseball bat after a "mar-
ital upheaval involving, among other things, the suspected infidelity of
[Hoyt's] husband. '50
Ironically, it was the more conservative Burger Court - not the
liberal Warren Court - that accepted women's one-hundred-year-old
argument that gender cannot ordinarily be the basis for excluding indi-
viduals from rights and benefits. In 1971, the Supreme Court for the
first time struck down an Idaho statute preferring men over women to
administer estates that categorized on the basis of gender."' Over the
next five years the Court not only guaranteed women a due process
46. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
48. Id. at 466.
49. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
50. Id. at 58-59.
51. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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right to abortions in Roe v. Wade,52 but also interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause to require "intermediate scrutiny" of gender classifi-
cations in Craig v. Boren.3 These important constitutional develop-
ments were neither internal to law, nor even foreshadowed by prior
constitutional cases; instead, they repudiated one hundred years of case
law.
The developments owed much to women's political, and not just
social or economic mobilization. That mobilization, in turn, owed much
to increased job opportunities for women during and after World War
II, to technological developments (such as the Pill) enabling women to
prevent unwanted or premature pregnancies, and the freedom from men
that urbanization and high-speed transporation facilitated. "Women's
Lib" sought adoption of a national Equal Rights Amendment on one
front, and aggressively litigated constitutional cases on the other -
through the ACLU's Women's Rights Project headed by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, the Women's Law Project and National Women's Law Cen-
ter (founded by Wendy Webster Williams and others), and the
Women's Legal Defense Fund. The irony is that at the very point
when state and national legislatures were receptive to issues of gender
equality, because of the new political activism of women, so too the
Supreme Court became receptive, and probably for the very same rea-
sons.
Women's constitutional victories at the Supreme Court level them-
selves generated ripple effects throughout the country. In the best ex-
ample, Roe spawned the "right to life" movement, which argues that
abortion is the taking of human life. 4 The right to life community is
a nomic one, just as women's rights communities are, and the twenty-
year battle over the meaning and vitality of Roe has seen the Supreme
Court caught like a sparrow in a badminton game between these two
intense nomic communities.
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See the survey of the Court's gender jurisprudence, and a
hint that more than intermediate scrutiny might be required, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
54. See Charles DiSalvo, Abortion and Consensus: The Futility of Speech, The Power
of Disobedience, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 219 (1991).
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C. Tort Law (Cigarettes and the Anti-Smoking Campaign)
In my prior examples, I have focused on statutory and constitu-
tional civil rights issues not vastly different from those at stake in
Brown. I would maintain that such civil rights issues are central to
American public law in the Brown era, and many others could be
added. But economic regulatory issues, like civil rights issues, also
evolve from the bottom up.5 Consider the regulation of cigarette
smoking.
Cigarettes are among the great American addictions of the twenti-
eth century, and the post-World War II era saw a rise in smoking,
particularly among women." At the same time people were lighting
up in ever greater numbers, medical researchers were studying the
health consequences of smoking with ever increasing zeal. By the time
the Surgeon General, our nation's chief health officer, convened an
advisory committee to examine the issue in 1962, there were over
seven thousand scientific publications examining the relationship be-
tween smoking and health. The advisory committee's report in 1964
found: "Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action""57 The
scientific and medical community had become a unified community of
interpretation. The result has been a thirty-year national interest in
smoking and its regulation. Regulation started in the 1960s with rules
adopted by the FTC. Congress quickly followed suit in 1965 by requir-
ing warning labels on packages." Following the lead of the FTC and
55. See, e.g., Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REv. 409 (1992); Emily
A. Spieler, Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspectives on the
Workers' Compensation Debate in West Virginia, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 333 (1993).
56. For the factual background in this paragraph, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF HHS,
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:
25 YEARS OF PROGRESS (1989). Professor Sylvia Law first suggested to me that regulation
of cigarettes presents a generalizable model of how Law emerges.
57. SURGEON GENERAL's ADviSORY COMMmrEE, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEW, SMOKING AND
HEALTH 33 (1964).
58. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat.
282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988)).
[Vol. 97:141
HeinOnline  -- 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 160 1994-1995
PUBLIC LAW FROM THE BOTTOM UP
some state legislatures, Congress amended the law in 1969 to ban
cigarette advertising on television.59
The regulation of cigarettes took a new turn in the 1980s,. as it
became clearer to scientists and citizens that cigarette smoking is not
only hazardous to the smoker's health, but also to the health of those
in the same room or building." The dangers of "passive smoking"
generated an aggressive new community of interpretation, one seeking
the ban of cigarettes entirely from public spaces. The guerilla warfare
against smoking has been fought in private workplaces, city councils,
state legislatures, the FAA, the Surgeon General's Office, and recently
in the state courts and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The
goals of the movement are threefold: (1) to discourage smoking, espe-
cially among the young, before they become addicted; (2) to prohibit
smoking in public places; and (3) to regulate cigarette companies more
extensively.
Illustrative of the third goal is the lawsuit filed by Rose Cippolone
and her husband, both of whom subsequently died of cancer, against
cigarette companies. The lawsuit was based on state tort and contract
law, including claims for fraud and misrepresentation, breach of war-
ranty, failure to warn, and conspiracy to withhold scientific information
about the dangers of smoking. Several state courts and federal courts
of appeals have allowed such lawsuits to proceed, thereby threatening
the financial future of cigarette companies and their wares. The compa-
nies took the Cippolones' lawsuit to the Supreme Court, but they were
opposed by a coalition of law professors and anti-smoking activists
who supported the Cippolones' claims.
The Supreme Court split every which way in Cippolone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., but a majority held that the claims of breach of express
warranty, fraud and misrepresentation, and conspiracy are not preempt-
ed by federal law (which does not provide a damages action at this
59. iPublic Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-39 (1988)) (amending the 1965 Act).
60. See OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENvnL. ASSESSMENT, U.S. EmrTn. PROTECTION AGEN-
CY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DIs-
ORDERS (1992).
61. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
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point)."2 The Supreme Court's decision hardly settles the war between
the tobacco companies and the anti-smoking forces, which will now do
battle in state and federal courts over the common-law claims that are
not preempted. There is some indication in light of recent revelations
that federal regulators at the FDA might also enter the fray. What is
particularly remarkable is that the Cippolone litigation would have been
inconceivable a decade ago, before the passive smoking evidence had
become widely accepted.
Viewing the law from the bottom up is only the beginning of
wisdom, for there is a deeper story of public law. Just as my genera-
tion was inspired by Brown, so we have been haunted by that decision.
I should say decisions, for there are three important Supreme Court
decisions in the Brown litigation:
o The 1954 decision (Brown I) declaring segregation un-
constitutional, which we tend to admire for its moral vision,
and notwithstanding the decision's slender support in tradi-
tional rule of law criteria.
o The '1955 decision (Brown 1) entering a remedial order
directing the lower courts to create unitary, nonsegregated
school systems, but "at all deliberate speed," which was read
as an invitation to delay. 3 It was not until the late 1960s
(when I was in high school) that significant desegregation was
achieved in the South.
o In 1989 Linda Brown, now a mother, persuaded the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the Topeka School System was
still segregated; the court ordered further relief for Brown in
the original lawsuit, which had never been dismissed. The Su-
preme Court in 1992 remanded the case (Brown III) for fur-
ther consideration" in light of its opinion in Pitts v. Free-
62. Id. at 2621-25 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
63. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1955) [hereinafter Brown 1].
64. Brown v. Board of Educ., 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992) [hereinafter Brown I11], vacat-
ing and remanding, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'g 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan.
1987).
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man,"5 where the Court suggested that it was time for districtcourts to abandon efforts to implement Brown.
Is the withering of Brown a betrayal of out vision of law from the
bottom up?
III. LAW AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS
Viewing law from the bottom up does not inexorably press law in
progressive directions, for social and political developments can press
in any direction. Moreover, a bottom up view of law does not deny
the importance of institutions - indeed, I insist upon their role. While
technology and the redistribution of social and economic power and
status may be the engines of constitutional and statutory change, their
instruments are the institutions of government.
There, the struggle for legal meaning is played out in a complex
way. Consistent with my understanding of law as effervescing upward
rather than being handed downward, I view state institutions as interde-
pendent with one another and with popular opinion.66 Accordingly,
law is a creation by several organs working together. The way insti-
tutions work together in our polity is hierarchical, for one institution
can veto or displace the policy choice made by an institution subordi-
65. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
66. For introductions to theories of the interactive institutional political process, see
Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEo L.J. 457 (1992); PEER C.
ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER (1992); WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973); OLIVER WILLIAM-
SON, THE ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, in ECONOMICS AS A PROCESS (Richard N. Langlois
ed., 1986). See also JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); KNIGHT, supra note 2; RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); JAMES G.
MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF
POLITICS (1989); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); ANDREW SCHOTrER, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS (1981). Earlier political science works exploring the role of the Supreme Court
within an interdependent political system include WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDI-
CiAL STRATEGY (1964); HERMAN C. PRrrCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT
(1961); Glendon A. Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Politi-
cal Behavior, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1007 (1958).
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nate to it. This structure of institutional interdependence creates a phe-
nomenon of "anticipated response." That is, a legal actor's policy
choice will be guided not only by the actor's own preference, but also
(in varying degrees depending upon the context) by what the actor
anticipates will be the interpretation of someone or an institution higher
up in the hierarchy of lawmaking authority.
This theme should be intuitive to lawyers. If I am giving you tax
advice, I shall consider your goal of minimizing your tax liability, but
I shall also consider the probable response of the IRS to different
interpretations I give to the tax laws. If I am sure a certain deduction
will trigger an IRS audit, I might advise you against taking it, even if
I consider taking the deduction a highly plausible or even probable
reading of the Internal Revenue Code. In evaluating your claims for a
deduction, the IRS, in turn will consider not just its interests and its
views about the statute, but will also consider what interpretation the
Tax Court will give the statute. The Tax Court will consider the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court's views before it interprets the
statute. And, perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court will interpret the
statute with an eye on what the current Congress wants. Just as the
Tax Court can be overruled by the Supreme Court and will therefore
consider the Supreme Court's views, so the Supreme Court in a statu-
tory case can be overridden by Congress and so will consider its
views, if they are known.67
To develop the hypothesis about the importance of anticipated
response for the evolution of statutory policy, consider judicial review
as a sequential political game. As argued above, the Supreme Court
does not choose the issues that bubble up through the political system;
those issues are presented to the Court by warring nomic communities.
Based upon the Justices' interpretations of the relevant legal materials,
their political preferences, and the facts and equities of the case, the
67. For theoretical and empirical support, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 391-97 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Statutory Deci-
sions]. For an excellent argument that a court seeking to protect original legislative expecta-
tions would also attend to current legislative preferences, see John Ferejohn & Barry
Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO L.J. 565 (1992).
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Court will have preferences about what it wants to do in the case. But
the Couirt's disposition of the case may not perfectly reflect these pref-
erences, what it thinks would be "right" in light of authoritative text,
precedent, or even social policy. The Court is very interested in how
its decisions will be received by the body politic, not only because the
Court's legitimacy is as precious as it is fragile, but also because polit-
ical organs are well situated to hurt the Court.
This is the warp and woof of constitutional law. Recall Marbury v.
Madison,8 Chief Justice John Marshall's ingenious opinion that estab-
lished the power of judicial review itself. The first part of Marshall's
opinion reviewed the refusal of Secretary of State Madison to hand
over a commission to Judge-designate Marbury. Marshall found
Madison's refusal illegal, but realized that any order from the Court di-
recting Madison to deliver the commission would have been disobeyed,
thereby undermining the Court's institutional position. Hence the sec-
ond part of the opinion announced that the Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain Marbury's case, because section thirteen of the Judiciary Act
granting the Court jurisdiction was unconstitutional. To accomplish this
trick, Marshall had to rewrite section thirteen to have it vest the Court
with original jurisdiction in mandamus cases, strain Article III to make
it inconsistent with the rewritten Judiciary Act, and then triumphantly
declare the authority of the Court to review statutes for consistency
with the Constitution. Marshall's opinion in Marbury is considered a
brilliant moment because the Chief Justice was able to head off politi-
cal disaster, an order bound to be disobeyed, while at the same time
embarrassing his enemies and establishing an important judicial power
for future cases.
Contrast Dred Scott v. Sandford,69 the most notorious decision in
the Court's history and only the second time (the first being Marbury)
the Court invalidated a federal statute. The decision is notorious partly
because it rejected the voice of Dred Scott, who represented a commu-
nity of interpretation (slaves who rejected their status, as well as their
abolitionist allies) that was to sweep the future. But the decision is also
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This discussion draws from William Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
69. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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a blunder of historic proportions, because it reflected the raw prefer-
ences of a Court dominated by Southerners and did not reflect the
same sort of astute anticipation of political response that characterized
Marbury. Chief Justice Roger Taney was every bit as good a lawyer as
John Marshall, but his political judgment failed him in the most impor-
tant case of his tenure: by invalidating the Missouri Compromise of
1820, which had prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory in return
for leaving it optional in the rest of the country, the Taney opinion in
Dred Scott failed to anticipate the political response, especially the
popular response. The abolitionists considered the decision a declaration
of War, and it undermined the ability of the political system to achieve
a compromised equilibrium on the slavery issue - dooming the insti-
tution Chief Justice Taney was trying to preserve. In a real sense, by
removing the possibility of compromise, Dred Scott did help precipitate
the Civil War.
Return to the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown, and consider
them as moves in an anticipated response game of this sort. Accounts
of the Court's internal discussions reveal that all or almost all of the
Justices believed de jure segregation to be unconstitutionally wrong,
but several Justices were hesitant about the political consequences of
requiring integration in the South.7 ° The Court solved its problem by
breaking up the opinion: Brown I, declaring de jure segregation in
public schools unconstitutional, would be announced immediately, while
Brown I, the remedial order, would be announced later, after further
briefing and (importantly) after the Court was able to gauge the po-
litical support for Brown I The Court's judgment in 1955 was that
immediate desegregation was not possible, and its "all deliberate speed"
formulation sought to give lower courts discretion to tailor relief politi-
cally.
Even Brown I1, however, yielded disappointing feedback to the
Court: the South turned toward defiance; the Eisenhower Administra-
tion remained studiously mum; and Congress did nothing to back up
the Court. The Brown II experiment was disappointing in the short
70. See KLUGER, supra note 18; Hutchinson, supra note 5; Tushnet & Lezin, supra
note 5.
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term, and the Court declined to press matters further for the next ten
years - with one exception. In Cooper v. Aaron,7" the Court directed
Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas to obey a desegregation order, but
the Court was able or willing to do so only because President Eisen-
hower was willing, even if not eager, to back up the federal order with
armed force.
The Court's posture changed markedly in and after 1963 because
the political climate changed: President Johnson won enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,72 whose Title II conditioned federal educa-
tional aid to desegregation; Johnson won a landslide victory over a
candidate who had opposed the Act; and the Court went on an imme-
diate and sweeping civil rights binge. Between 1963 and 1971, the
Court announced that Brown I's regime of "all deliberate speed" was
at an end, and swifter progress toward a unitary school system was
required.73 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,74
the Court unanimously approved a sweeping district court order requir-
ing, among other things, busing to achieve racial desegregation.
Swann was in some respects the high-water point of the Court's
willingness to enforce Brown, but the decision yielded political reac-
tions that were largely negative. Jurisdiction-stripping bills were seri-
ously considered in Congress, state and local politicians (including
liberal Democrats) ran against busing, and Richard Nixon won a land-
slide victory in 1972 on a platform critical of busing. Nixon had al-
ready remade the Court, with four appointments, but it was not until
after 1972 that the Burger Court initiated a process whereby lower
courts were limited as to what they could do to remedy Brown viola-
tions. Indeed, the Burger Court's retreat coincided with an important
development at the bottom: white flight from integrated school systems.
The ground level, where the battles for law are fought, was often in-
71. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a) et seq. (1988).
73. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See also Griffin v.
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963);
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
74. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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hospitable to federal judicial requirements that school systems be inte-
grated.
The Rehnquist Court, in a series of cases including Brown I, has
announced that lower courts should start divesting themselves of juris-
diction over desegregation cases.75 The Court noted in 1992: "Where
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it
does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the authority and
beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract
these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts."
76
Concurring in this opinion, Justice Scalia added:
At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume,
without any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from
the days when Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have
an appreciable effect upon current operation of schools. We are close to
that time."
These decisions are usually explained as the effort by Reagan-
appointed conservatives to retreat from the mandate of Brown. Indeed,
the Reagan-Bush Justices are almost uniformly more conservative about
judicial remedies for Brown than are Justices appointed by other Presi-
dents. This itself is part of the feedback process: Presidents Reagan
and Bush were elected on a platform of getting the federal government
off people's backs, and the Justices they appointed have on the whole
reflected this sentiment. But the bottom up view of law would insist
that more is going on than simply a more conservative bunch of Justic-
es imposing their raw preferences on the lower courts. I believe that
the Court is also responding pragmatically to residential patterns and
politically to the vanishing support for continuing the costly process of
implementing Brown's vision of completely integrated public schools.
Indeed, in Pitts, African-American parents sought intervention in order
to argue that they preferred neighborhood schools and disliked busing;
75. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, IlI S. Ct. 630 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.
Ct. 1430 (1992); Brown 11I, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992) (remanded for further consideration in
light of Pitts).
76. 112 S. Ct. at 1448.
77. Id. at 1453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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they wanted neighborhood schools even at the expense of de facto
segregation, so long as the schools were adequately funded.78
The anticipated response game that the Supreme Court has been
engaged in these last forty years of desegregation litigation deepens our
understanding of bottom up public lawmaking. On the one hand, we
can see that the creation of public law is a dynamic process: not only
are new challenges being constantly presented by new or persistent
communities of interpretation, but the old challenges are handled dif-
ferently over time by the same Justices, either because of feedback
they have received from the world or because of new political pres-
sures to which they are responsive. The Supreme Court does follow the
election returns, not only because new elections yield Presidents who
appoint Justices with whom they agree, but also because new elections
yield new political balances to which the Justices are attentive.79
On the other hand, issues of public law do not remain in flux
forever, and the anticipated response feature of public lawmaking sug-
gests that at some point - perhaps sooner, perhaps later - the politi-
cal and social process will become stable because all the political ac-
tors will realize that any effort they might make to change the legal
status quo will result in their being overridden or penalized.
The foregoing analysis suggests a consensus vision of law. When
there is general societal agreement about what the rules are, or when
dissenters are unable to gain institutional allies for their views, the
consensus has the force of law or soon enough influences what had
previously been taken as law. Similar to Dean Teree Foster's expli-
cation of ius cogens, customary practice in international law,8" the
78. 112 S. Ct. at 1430.
79. For empirical evidence to this effect, see THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme
Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions?, 87 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 87 (1993). See also David G. Barnum, The Supreme
Court and Public Opionion: Judicial Decisionmaking in the Post New Deal Period, 47 J.
Pol. 652 (1985); GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, COURTS AND PUBLIC OPINION, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
80. See Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger & Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Am-
plifying Content-Based Speech Regulations through Binding International Law (1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
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positive commands of domestic law are understood in light of institu-
tional consensus, actual practice, and popular acceptance. Consider this
popular and institutional consensus view of law in connection with the
types of issues examined in Part II.
A. Statutory Interpretation (Griggs)
Recall immediate efforts within the EEOC to interpret Title VII to
prohibit at least some employer policies that have a "demonstrable
racial effect." The statutory bargain struck to enact Title VII represent-
ed a compromise between the House's preferences and the more con-
servative Senate's preferences on issues concerning how intrusive the
government should be in employer hiring and promotion decisions."
Once Title VI was enacted into law, however, the agency populated
by Johnson Administration liberals could move statutory policy to the
left of the Senate's preferences because there were not enough votes in
either the House or Senate to override an agency protected by presi-
dential veto. Dynamic statutory interpretation can occur immediately
after a law's enactment, as it did in the Johnson and Nixon EEOC,
because the ideology of the implementing agency might be very differ-
ent from that of the enacting coalition. 2
The EEOC moved very cautiously, nonetheless, both because it
was internally uncertain as to the best way to enforce the statute and
because it was concerned that the Court, if not Congress, would over-
ride a dramatic policy shift. The EEOC took a risk by supporting the
NAACP in the Griggs litigation, but the risk paid off when the Su-
preme Court confirmed a new Title VII policy that represented a dra-
81. Indeed, the compromise was skewed to the right of even the preference of the
median Senator, because the need to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Senate rendered
conservative Senator Dirksen the pivotal voter. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN,
THE LONGEST DE3ATE (1986) (detailed account of the political maneuvering within Con-
gress).
82. Positive political theory suggests that Congress would limit the agency's ability to
shift policy immediately, through procedural as well as substantive provisions in the statute.
See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. EcoN & ORG. 243 (1987). Dirksen tried to do this with the EEOC by in-
sisting on procedural rules limiting the EEOC's policymaking power.
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matic shift to the left of the policy adopted by Congress in 1964.
Three different political dynamics enabled Title VII's policy to shift
radically to the left between 1964 and 1971. One dynamic was simply
the internal politics of the EEOC and the Supreme Court, both of
which were pressed from below by an academic and elite cultural con-
sensus in favor of vigorous enforcement of Title VII.
A second dynamic was some shift to the left in congressional
preferences between 1964 hnd 1971 due at least in part to the in-
creased electoral power of African Americans following enactment of
the Voting Rights Act, of 1965.3 When the preferences of Congress
shift in the direction of the interpreter's (EEOC or Supreme Court)
preferences, then the interpreter has more freedom to apply the statute
dynamically, since the only Congress to which it is directly accountable
is the current Congress. But any shift in legislative preferences between
1964 and 1971 was modest 4 and does not completely explain how
the EEOC and the Court could shift Title VII's policy so far to the
left.
Griggs might have been an interpretation of Title VII that repre-
sented a policy more vigorous than that which Congress would have
wanted in 1971. Yet Congress did not override Griggs, even though it
amended Title VII immediately after the case was decided, and even
though the employer community wanted Griggs curtailed or overridden.
The key to this nonevent was the enthusiastic endorsement of Griggs
in committee reports drafted in 1971 by the House and Senate labor
committees.8 5 Those reports may not have been representative of the
views of the median member of Congress, however, because the House
and Senate labor committees have in the last generation been dominat-
ed by members with preferences to the left of their colleagues on is-
sues of civil rights.8 6 Because those committees exercise "gatekeeping"
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).
84. BARBARA SINCLAIR, AGENDA, POLICY, AND ALIGNMENT CHANGE FROM COOLIDGE
TO REAGAN, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 291, 306-07 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 3d ed. 1985).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 21-22 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2156-57; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 14 (1971).
86. There is some question in the literature as to whether congressional committees are
likely to have "outlier" preferences and, if so, whether the chamber will defer to them. See
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power over issues on the legislative agenda, they have substantial abili-
ty to head off overrides, especially if they are supported by the majori-
ty party leadership, which in 1971 was similarly liberal on civil rights
issues.
The Nixon and Carter Administrations supported Griggs and its
stepchild, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 7 where the Court in 1979
adopted the EEOC's view that Title VII permits employers and unions
to adopt voluntary affirmative action programs, especially as measures
to improve workforce percentages that might be vulnerable under
Griggs. Ronald Reagan and his successor ran for President on plat-
forms hostile to Griggs and Weber, and for three election cycles that
platform won substantial presidential victories. Although Congress was
in the 1980s more committed to Griggs than it had been in the 1970s,
the Reagan EEOC led a movement to overrule or narrow both Griggs
and Weber. Since the EEOC does not have substantive rulemaking
power, it was required to appeal to the Supreme Court, as the Nixon
EEOC had done in 1971. Here the President's lawmaking authority
manifested itself in another way: by 1989, there were four Reagan-
nominated Justices in place. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
8 8
a closely divided Court, with all four Reagan Justices in the majority,
narrowed Griggs by creating new and higher burdens of proof for
plaintiffs alleging disparate impact discrimination.
An outraged Congress in 1990 tried to override Wards Cove, an
effort that failed by one vote in the Senate, 9 suggesting that the
Court might have hit the congressional veto median on the button. The
median slid a bit in 1991, when a more moderate override bill passed
Congress and was signed by the President." The Wards Cove episode
shows how the interdependence of the legislative, executive, and judi-
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLAnVE ORGANIZATION, ch. 4 (1991). Through
most of the last generation, the labor committees in both House and Senate have been sig-
nificantly more liberal than the chamber medians. See id. at 129 (Table 4.6) (House);
Eskridge, Overriding Statutory Decisions, supra note 67, at 369 n.114 (Senate).
87. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
88. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
89. 136 Cong. Rec. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
90. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (cod-
ified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1992)).
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cial branches affects lawmaking, for each institutional actor behaved
strategically in light of the preferences of the others: the EEOC cali-
brated its highly rightward preferences to craft a position the Court
could accept, and the Court sought a moderate position (it refused to
overrule Griggs, for example) in order to avert an immediate congres-
sional override. Congress, in turn, had to moderate its own preferences
for a strongly leftward override, in order to accommodate the
President's preferences, or the preferences of enough Republicans to
make a veto override possible.
More important, the preferences of the different institutions were
not static, and their evolution was responsive to changing popular atti-
tudes. That Griggs was put into play at all was an institutional 're-
sponse to campaign themes successfully advanced by the Republican
candidates throughout the 1980s. Because of that popular pressure, as
well as the presidential veto, Congress was unable to return policy to
Griggs. But Congress was able to move policy away from Wards
Cove, though only after a further process of popular feedback that
persuaded Republican Senators in 1991 that a civil rights bill was
needed." President Bush's willingness to sign the bill in 1991, even
though he denounced the not-so-much-different 1990 bill as blatant
"quotas" legislation, was probably something more than mere political
calculation (until 1992, every Bush veto was sustained).
B. Administrative Law (Chevron)
A further issue posed by Griggs involves the interaction of agen-
cies and courts in the creation of public law. Under the traditional top-
down view of law, the role of agencies is to implement the directives
Congress put in their authorizing statutes, and the role of the Court is,
as in Marbury, to say what the law is and to override agencies that
strayed from it. The modem regulatory state has moved toward a more
bottom up view of law, where Congress creates agencies, gives them
general goals, and then turns them loose on an unpredictable world in
91. In October 1991, a group of Republican Senators who had supported the 1990
veto allegedly told President Bush that they were not inclined to support a second veto. The
defection of just one Senator would have ensured a Senate override of the veto.
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which different communities of interpretation will vie for the agency's
favor. A question then arises: What should be the relationship between
the Supreme Court and agencies?
The leading analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.'2 The Clean Air
Act, as rewritten in 1977, required states that had not met federal am-
bient air quality requirements to establish a permit program to regulate
"new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollutions.93 Be-
tween 1977 and 1981, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ex-
perimented with various rules to implement the legislative directive.
Industry groups argued for a "bubble concept" defining "stationary
source" as a whole plant, thereby allowing firms to avoid applying for
permits when they increased emissions in one part of the plant, so long
as the plant's overall emissions level did not increase. The EPA reject-
ed the bubble concept, however, and required plants in targeted states
to obtain permits for emissions increases anywhere within a plant.94 In
1981, the EPA changed its position and adopted the bubble concept.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned the agency's dynamic inter-
pretation as inconsistent with the statutory language and purpose."
The Supreme Court in Chevron reversed, holding that where Congress
had not explicitly addressed the interpretive issue, courts should defer
to the agency's decision so long as it is "reasonable."
Justice John Paul Stevens' opinion in Chevron held that courts
should defer to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with
implementing:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather
than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress,
the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges - who have no
92. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988).
94. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-59.
95. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (following ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), rev'd sub nom.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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constituency - have a duty to respect the legitimate policy choices made
by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the
public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsi-
bilities in the political branches."96
The opinion also rejected the argument that the agency's change of
position dilutes the deference owed to it. "An initial agency interpreta-
tion is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to
engage in informal rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.""
I would read Chevron as an exemplar of strategic institutional
interaction. The decision is the Court's signal that the bottom up strug-
gle for statutory meaning should be fought and focused at one level.
Chevron reveals the Court's accurate recognition that agencies are not
only better situated to evaluate new factual circumstances and new
efforts by private communities to create law, but are also better situat-
ed to discern political consensus and discord. Unlike the Court, an
agency is not only politically accountable, but also politically well-
informed - about the preferences not only of the President who ap-
points and sometimes controls the agency, but also of the Congress,
whose members communicate with, pressure, and appropriate money
for the agency.9" Recognizing this, Chevron insists upon deference to
agency views, even when they are in the process of changing. There is
a loophole to Chevron that preserves a substantive role for the Court.
Consider the following example of Chevron in action.
96. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
97. Id. at 863-64. Accord, NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975).
But see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 436 U.S. 443 (1978) (longstanding agen-
cy interpretation receives greater deference).
98. Agency heads are responsive to the President, who not only appoints them, but
also supervises their rulemaking through the OMB, and can discipline them directly (for
executive department agencies) or indirectly (for independent agencies). Congress communi-
cates with agencies informally all the time, and formally through confirmations, oversight,
and appropriations.
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In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service
Act, which provides federal funding for family-planning services.99
The purpose of the Act is to assist in making "comprehensive volun-
tary family planning services" available to people. The Act authorizes
the provision of federal funds to support the establishment and opera-
tion of voluntary family planning projects and empowers the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HI-S) to promulgate regulations impos-
ing conditions on grant recipients. Section 1008 stipulates: "None of
the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning.""' The 1971 regulations
provided that, "the project will not provide abortions as a method of
family planning," but did not regulate the form of counseling or the
distribution of information at federally funded projects.'' In 1988,
HHS promulgated new regulations preventing personnel in Title X
projects from providing any counseling or information about abortion
to care recipients.0 2 In Rust v. Sullivan 3 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the agency's new regulations under Chevron, finding that the
statute and its legislative history did not clearly answer the question,
the agency's interpretation was a-reasonable reading of the statute, and
the agency's change in policy was one that the dynamic administrative
interpreter was entitled to make. Four Justices dissented, on the ground
that the agency's interpretation pressed the statute well beyond its orig-
inal purpose and arguably infringed upon both'free speech and abortion
rights. 104
99. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
572, 84 Stat. 1506.
100. According to the conference report for the Act, the § 1008 restriction was to en-
sure that Title X funds would "be used only to support preventive family planning services,
population research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educa-
tional activities." Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5080, 5081-82.
101. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1971).
102. Section 59.8(a)(1) of the 1988 regulations specified that henceforth a "[t]itle X
project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning." See also §
59.8(a)(2)-(3), -(b)(5). 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (text of section suspended effective Feb. 5, 1993).
103. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) .
104. "Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, dissented in Rust because the agency's
position went well beyond, and arguably against, Congress' announced purpose of providing
counseling and materials to help people plan their families. The statute's exclusion of plans
[Vol. 97:141
HeinOnline  -- 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 176 1994-1995
PUBLIC LAW FROM THE BOTTOM UP
Rust was a case where there was no popular or political consensus,
and the Court knew the score as well as the agency did: the President
supported the restrictive regulation and would use his veto power to
protect the Court if it sustained IEHS, while Congress was opposed to
the gag order and would use its legislative power to protect the Court
if it were to overturn HHS. This is a case where the Court could vote
its raw preferences, and the Justices lined up pretty much the way they
lined up cases challenging abortion restrictions on constitutional
grounds.05
C. Constitutional Law (Abortion)
Cases like Rust signaled the political system that the Reagan-Bush
Court was open to reconsidering the validity of Roe. On the eve of the
1992 presidential election, and to the surprise of many pundits, the
Court reaffirmed Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."6 Casey is
the apotheosis of a pragmatic, consensus view of law.
There were no more than two Justices on the Court in 1992 who
thought Roe was correctly decided as an original matter. Yet five Jus-
tices reaffirmed the right recognized in Roe. The plurality opinion was
where abortion is a "method" of family planning apparently referred only to programs that
actually perform abortions, and not to programs that provide professional information about
the possibility, he argued. Justice O'Connor dissented because the issues of censorhsip and
women's opportunities to obtain useful information raised constitutional questions that Con-
gress needed to address. Justice Blackmun dissented because the agency regulations were an
unconstitutional infringement upon doctors' First Amendment rights to provide information
and counseling and women's rights to abortions. Justice Marshall joined the Stevens and
Blackmun dissents.
105. That is, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented on the constitutional
issue in Rust, and all three have consistently supported a broad reading of Roe. Justices
O'Connor and Souter were on the fence: the former dissented on the narrow ground that the
Court should interpret the statute narrowly to avoid thorny constitutional issues, and the
latter remained undecided until the eleventh hour (according to records of the Court's inter-
nal deliberations, which are available in the Papers of Thurgood Marshall, housed at the
Madison Building of the Library of Congress). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
Scalia, and Kennedy - the four Justices who sought to narrow or overrule Roe in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) - strongly favored the HHS "gag or-
der."
106. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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written jointly by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the first
two of whom had written or joined opinions hostile to Roe and critical
of its reasoning. A number of hypotheses can be advanced for the
willingness of an anti-abortion Court to reaffirm Roe. One is that the
Court did fear an override of any decision overruling Roe. Though it
seems unlikely that a conflictual issue such as this one would have
sustained a constitutional amendment, Congress was prepared to adopt
a Freedom of Choice Act assuring a woman's right to control her own
body during pregnancy."0 7 Such a statute would have been vetoed by
President Bush, and it would not have been clear that two-thirds ma-
jorities could not have been mustered for an override of such a veto.
But a Supreme Court overruling of Roe would also likely have in-
creased the chances of Bush's defeat in the 1992 election, for it would
have galvanized millions of women in favor of any plausible Demo-
cratic nominee. With Bush's defeat would have come a political over-
ride of any Court decision refusing to recognize a right to abortion.'
Casey itself was a highly conservative interpretation of Roe; holding
that the states can regulate the right to abortion in many different
ways. Casey cuts the heart out of Roe even while reaffirming it -
perhaps the perfect result from the perspective of the joint opinion, and
certainly a much more attractive result from their point of view than
anything Congress would enact.
This is a plausible hypothesis, but I think a stronger one is one
suggested by the joint opinion itself. The joint opinion contains a re-
markable constitutional history, explaining not only why events subse-
quent to Roe did not compel its overruling, but also why the Court
was right to overrule Lochner v. New York. 9 and Plessy, but not
Roe.11° The joint opinion tells a story of shifting popular as well as
institutional consensus: the laissez-faire philosophy embedded in
Lochner was obsolete after the Great Depression and the New Deal,
107. See the proposed Freedom of Choice Act, S. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992);
H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), nicely analyzed in Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in
Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
108. Of course, Bush was defeated anyway, but his defeat was hardly predictable in
June 1992, when Casey was decided.
109. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) .
110. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812-16 (joint opinion).
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and the white supremacist philosophy embedded in Plessy was an em-
barrassment after World War II; the Court was wise to overrule each
decision, because they were inconsistent with established political
agreement. Roe, on the other hand, remains a viable political institu-
tion, if anything more viable in light of women's increasing involve-
ment in politics and in light of the nation's repudiation of Justice-
designate Robert Bork because of his anti-privacy jurisprudence, to
mention just two salient developments.
IV. CONCLUDING NORMATIVE QUALMS
The joint opinion in Casey is the Court's bowing to the winds of
history and politics - acknowledging the familiar lesson that once
Pandora opens the box, there is no closing it. Like Brown III, Casey
reflects my view of law as popular and institutional consensus. Howev-
er, like Brown III, Casey reflects the normative qualms we should have
about the description of law that has been outlined in this article. Rec-
ognizing that law is created by nomic communities from the bottom up
does not tell us which community's views should prevail. Recognizing
that law reflects existing political consensus does not tell us whether
the particular consensus is a good or just one. The descriptive vision
of law I have outlined does suggest that our polity acts perilously
when it stubbornly suppresses one group, so much that the group is
effectively excluded from citizenship; but the descriptive vision tells us
little more than that.
Casey, for example, reaffirmed Roe but nonetheless upheld most of
Pennsylvania's restrictions on the woman's right to an abortion, includ-
ing a requirement that a mature woman must wait twenty-four hours
between asking for an abortion and receiving one, and a requirement
that a married woman certify that she has told her husband of her
decision to have an abortion. The Court upheld these precise require-
ments for pragmatic reasons: even though they may burden the
woman's decision, they also help ensure that it is an informed and
deliberative decision. One might question whether such burdens would
have been upheld if men were capable of pregnancy as women are.
Recall Judith Jarvis Thompson's famous kidney machine hypothetical: a
man wakes up, finding medical apparatus attached to his kidney, to
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support the life of a man next to him, a celebrated violinist in fact.
The support is only needed for nine months, after which the violinist
will be able to live a normal life."' Would a court or a legislature
require the first man to give up nine months of his life to support the
second? It seems doubtful, even if the first man were partly responsible
for the second man's predicament.
Similar equality concerns can be raised about Brown III Is the
following situation intolerable: the state works for a hundred years to
create a system of apartheid, in which anyone with a drop of black
blood is rigorously separated from the rest of society and in a way that
hourly reminds such people that they are considered inferior and servi-
ent. Apartheid reinforces the views of the dominant race that the segre-
gated race is inferior. The society becomes aware that its policy is an
embarrassment in the world community and ends it. But residential
patterns do not change, and the school districts created around residen-
tial patterns continue to divide children by race. The Court then says
that thirty years of effort is enough. How you will vote in cases like
this is revealed by whether you can keep a straight face.
111. See Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, I Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47
(1971).
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